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of the

STATE OF UTAH
FRANCE~

T. WIGHTMAN,

)

Plaintiff-Appellant,)
)

vs.

Case No. 9987

BETTILYON'S, INC. and
)
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
a municipal corporation,
)
DefendantsRespondents.

)
)

REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF
AND APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE

This is an action for damages for personal
injury resulting from a fall on a public sidewalk.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court granted defendants' Motions
for Summary Judgment.

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal of the
trial court's Summary Judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents accepted the Statement of Facts
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in Appellant's Brief as the statement was drawn
from the record, but objected to additional facts
outside of but not contradicted by the record on
which appellant would rely.

Appellant's

position

is that the discovery documents before the trial
court did not deal with many issues of fact, and
therefore, the record was insufficient for the
Court to grant Summary Judgment.

Appellant has set

out what she claims the material facts l-Jere which
the trial court did not consider.

Respondents

argue at pages 2 and 3 of their Brief:
" The burden rests upon the resisting party
raise a credible issue or show that he has
evidence not then available, otherwise a Summary Judgment may be properly rendered for
the moving party.' Dupler v. Yates, 10 U.2d
251, 269, 351 P.2d 624. An unverified complaint was held in that case to be sufficient
to raise a ~redible issue.'

1 to

'~hen

*

* *

the resisting party's standing in
court is challenged through the Summary Judgment procedure, he is then required to place
before the court those facts which he claims
are sufficient to raise a credible issue.''
Respondents grossly misquote the Dupler case.
The entire sentence quoted above reads:
'~here,

as in the instant case, the materials
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presented by the moving party are sufficient
to entitle him to a direct verdict and the
opposing party fails either to offer counteraffidavits or other materials that raise a
credible issue or to show that he has evidence
not then available, Summary Judgment may be
rendered for the moving party." (Emphasis added)
Respondents argue that by simply moving for Summary
Judgment~

the resisting party is then required to

place before the Court

!!!

though the moving party's
some facts on some issues.

that

counte~measures

facts on all issues, even

material~

deal only with

The Dupler eRse

indieat~s

are necessary only when the

moving party's materials are sufficient to decide
all issues.

£2.

See Christensen v. Financial Service

(1953) 14 U.2d 101, 377 P.2d 1010, where this

Court said:
"The adverse party • • • may serve opposing
affidavits but is not required to do so. He
may stand on his pleadings provided his
allegations, if proved, would establish a
basis for recovery."

Thus all appellant says is that the record before
the trial court did not present materials sufficient
to enable the trial court to conclude, as it did,
that the ~eeds growing upon Bettilyon's property were
natural growth, or that appellant had a safe and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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convenient route available to her which she failed

to take.

Appellant's Brief sets out what the facts

not before the trial court actually

l~ere,

simply to

show that questions of fact do exist in which
respondents presented no record and, therefore,
Summary Judgment should not have been granted.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULIKG AS A MATTER

OF LAW DEFENDANT BETTILYON 1 S, INC. HAD NO DUTY
TO

ELIMINATE

NATURL\L GROt.JTH

OF WEEDS OVER THE

PUBLIC SIDEWALl< AND THAT THE WEEDS WERE
NATURAL GROWTH.

POINT II.

PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF NUISANCE IS PERMISSIBLE.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING PLAINTIFF

CONTRillUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
POINT IV.

THE COURT ERRED IN

FIND!~~

PLAINTIFF ASSUMED

THE RISK AS A MATTER OF LAW.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER
OF LAW DEFENDANT BETTIL YON'S, INC. HAD NO DUTY
TO ELIMINATE NATURAL GRO\-JTH OF WEEDS OVER

PORTIONS OF THE PUBLIC SIDEWALK AND
WEEDS

~JERE

THA~

THE

NATURAL GROWTH.

Respondents cite Giles v. Walker (England,
1890), 24 Q.B. Div. 656, an action for failure to
control thistles growing on defendant's land
following cultivation and disuse 1·1hen the thistles
blew onto plaintiff's land.

The court's decision

is certainly not well reasoned for the decision,
in its entirety, says:

"I never heard of such an action as this.
There can be no duty between adjoining
occupiers to cut the thistles, which are the
natural growth of the soil."
That rule might be proper for rural areas,

particularly since in Giles

defendant would have

had to control thistles on his entire farm to
prevent harm to plaintiff.

But that case should

not apply to an occupier of land abutting the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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public sidewalk in the city where lots are

6

relatively small.

To require urban abutters to

cut high weeds merely along the sidewalk is

reasonable l·Jhen compared to the great risk
to pedestrians if they are not cut.

Someone

must cut them, and the abutter is best able to
do

so.
Respondents cite Michalson v. Nutting (Mass.,

1931), 175 N.E. 490 (Respondents' Brief, p. 5),
\-lhere tree roots grel-1 from defendant's land to
plaintiff's land causing damage, and the court
dismissed the action saying planting of trees is
a reasonable use of land and plaintiff could have
cut off the intruding roots.

Respondents admit

the weeds here were an "inconvenience and annoyance"
(Respondents 1 Brief, p. 16) and caused a "danger
which lurked on either side of the sidel>Jalk"
(Respondents• Brief, p. 25), but respondent
Bettilyon 1 s seeks to escape responsibility by
saying, "The city had the right, if not the duty,
to cut offending weeds."
p. 6,)

(Respondents' Brief,

But what does the fact that the city also

has the duty, as the Michalson case says, have to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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do with Bettilyon's duty to appellant?

As

7
bet~een

land occupier and a member of the public

using the public side\o~alk, the land occupier should

have the duty.

Respondent Bettilyon's citation of

the Michalson case would indicate that the duty
should be placed on members of the public.

Further-

more, the Michalson case says the trees were a
reasonable use of land; it does not say that maintaining '"eeds on a public sidewalk is a reasonable
use.

Respondents' Brief (p. 8} says that Section
38-1-0 Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, which
enjoins any person "having control of any premises
to • • • permit on the sidewalk any • • • filth,
rubbish, refuse matter, ice, water, mud • • • ,
dead trees, tree stumps • • • or other things
• • •", does not apply to this case because weeds
or natural growth is not mentioned.

Certainly

dead trees and tree stumps are natural growth.
Certainly weeds can grow onto the sidewalk just as
ice, water and mud can collect there
nature.

by force of

Certainly weeds come within "filth,

rubbish and refuse matter."

Obviously the
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Ordinance was intended to require abutters to keep
the sidewalk clear, and respondent Bettilyon's
violated that Ordinance.
Berger v. Salt Lake City (1920), 56 U. 403,
191 P. 233, incorrectly cited by respondents at
page

9 as 191 P. 223, is not helpful here.

There

the court held the city has no duty to remove
natural accumulations of snow and ice from the

sidewalk because

othe~1ise

an unreasonable and

impossible burden would be placed upon the city.
the court made that distinction imminently clear

when it recited that the precise question to be
determined t-1as:
"Do the ordinary rules of lat-1 respecting
the duty of cities and to~ms to exercise
ordinary care and diligence to maintain the

streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe
condition and free from dangerous obstructions
apply to natural and ordinary accumulations
of snot-1 and ice?" (Emphasis added.)
Respondents' attempt to distinguish Safeway
Stores, Inc, v. Billings (Okla., 1959), 335 P.2d
636 (incorrectly cited by respondents as 353
P.2d), where a pedestrian tripped over a tree

felled
from defendant's land across the sidewalk,
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on the grounds "defendant had created the condition
by

his affirmative act,''

p. 10 ).

(Respondents' Brief,

That is contrary to the facts of the case,

for the court said at 335 P.2d 638:
"It is clear, however, that Safeway Stores,
Inc. or its contractor for the construction of
the store building, did not cut down any of
the remaining trees on the block until in
October after this accident in August."

Thus, that decision does not rest on an affirmative
act but as the court said, on the "duty to persons

lawfully using the walk not to create or maintain
••• an obstruction on the public way. 11 (Emphasis
added.)

Respondents• argument at page 12 of their Brief
to the effect that weeds are natural grol.Jth even
when growing because the land was previously
cultivated is effectively met by the definition of
natural condition of the land contained in
Restatement of Torts, Section 363, Comment B Yhich

says:
'''Natural condition of the land 1 is • • •
also used to include the natural growth of
• • • weeds • • • upon land not artificially
made receptive thereto."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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at page 22 of her Brief that Bettilyon's actively

caused weeds to grow along the side\-lalk by erecting a fence at the sidewalk edge which would cause
weed seeds to drop at the fence and cause all high
weeds between the fence and sidewalk to fall over

onto the

sid~o~alk.

Thus the trial court erred when it ruled that
respondent Bettilyon 1 s had no duty to eliminate
weeds growing over the sidewalk, and further
erred when it ruled that the weeds were natural
growth.

POINT II.
PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF NUISANCE IS PERMISSIBLE.
Respondents argue that plaintiff is raising
nuisance for the first time on appeal and should
not be permitted to do so.
Although the Complaint does not use the word
"nuisance,"

it does refer to an "obstructed con-

dition on such side\'lalku (R. 1).
78-38-1,

u.

Since Section

C.A., 1953, defines a nuisance to

include obstructions, and since Rule 8(a), U.R.C.P.,
requires only "a short and plain statement of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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claim," respondents were given adequate notice in
appellant's Complaint of her claim.

It is not

necessary to specifically say ••nuisance."

A

Complaint is required only to give the opposing
party fair notice of the nature and basis of the
grounds of the claim and a general indication of
the type o.f 1 itigation involved.

Blackham v.

Snelgrove (1955), 3 U.2d 157, 280 P.2d 453.

By

Rule 8(e) (1), "No technical forms of pleadings
or motions are required,
11

11

and by Rule 8 (f),

All pleadings shall be so construed as to do

substantial justice."

Even so, by Rule 15(b):
11

The court may allow the pleadings to be
amended when the presentation of the merits
of the action will be served thereby and
the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence
would prejudice him in maintaining his
action or defense upon the merits. 11
Respondents do not claim they have been prejudiced
because they have not been prejudiced in this
instance.

They have fully replied in their Brief

to appellant's allegations of nuisance, and this

appeal still \·1ould have been brought because
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Summary Judgment was granted also upon the grounds
that appellant was contributorily negligent and
assumed the risk (R. 28).

Those latter two

grounds had to be a basis for the trial court's
Judgment since respondent Salt Lake City Corporation brought its motion only upon those latter
two grounds (R. 26).

Both cases cited by

respondents' Brief (p. 13, 14) deal with cases
where appellant changed the theory of the case
after evidence and instructions to the jury had
been concluded.

In these cases respondent was

prejudiced by new theory being raised, but not
in this instance.
Cannon v. Newberger, 1 U.2d 396, 399, 268
P.2d 425 (Respondents' Brief, p. 15) holds only
that natural growth on an abutter's property can
be a nuisance and that the question is one of
fact in each instance.

POINT III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING PLAINTIFF
CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.

POINT IV.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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THE RISK AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Respondents' argument as to contributory negligence and assumption of risk is entirely based upon

three facts, being (1) appellant was generally
aware of the weeds, (2) walked through and fell, (3)
even though she might have walked around them.
Therefore, respondents say she was not entitled to
try her case to a jury.

That entire argument is

effectively met by cases from other jurisdictions
cited in Appellant's Brief.

However, Baker v.

Decker (1949), 117 U. 15, 212 P.2d 679, which
case was not discovered in appellant's counsel's
research for her original Brief, is decisive. There
plaintiff tenant walked along a hotel hall and came
upon a table, a canvas dropcloth and a paste bucket

which defendant painter had left in the hall.

She

noticed the canvas covering the floor and stepped on
it with her left foot.

In bringing her right foot

forl-lard, she either misjudged the height of the canvas

or caught her right heel in a fold of the covering
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and tripped.

Defendants said plaintiff was con-

tributorily negligent as a matter of

la'~

either

because she failed to use due care in proceeding
over the equipment or because she failed to take
another readily available route through the halls.
This Court said, beginning at 212 P.2d 682:
''It is well settled that mere knol-lledge
that a walk is dangerous, unsafe for travel,
is not sufficient to establish contributory
negligence though there is another way that
is safe and convenient, and to defeat
recovery it must appear that the traveler
knew or as an ordinarily cautious person
should have ltnown that it was imprudent to
use the walk • • • • The danger portrayed
by the manner in which the equipment was
placed in the hall was not so serious that
plaintiff can be charged with indiscretion
or lack of due care in not deviating from
her usual course of exit from the building.
The hallway was for the use of the tenants,
the absence of barricades would lead a person
to believe the route was not dangerous, the
presence of the table, canvas and bucket would
not suggest exposure to injury, and if plaintiff believed that by using ordinary care she
could transverse the hallway in safety, she
was not negligent. Plaintiff did not know
she was taking an extraordinary risk, and she
had no idea that she was traveling over an
unsafe course and no reason to suspect a
hazardous condition. • • • Under the facts
and circumstances of this case, it was for
the jury to determine whether or not plaintiff exercised due care and caution when she
elected to continue dolm the hallway on the
second floor rather than to proceed by a
route not usually traveled by her. l·Je cannot
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say that plaintiff should be charged with
contributory negligence as a matter of law,
by reason of her choice of route • • • •
"The only evidence touching on contributory negligence uas given by the
plaintiff and it deals with her seeing the
canvas on the floor, stepping over the
'rumpled end 1 to~ith her left foot and catching the heel of her right shoe in a hole or
in a bunched part of the canvas. The exact
manner in which her heel became enmeshed in
the folds or checked by the end of the canvas
cannot be determined. Hot·lever, Mrs. Baker
eith~r miscalculated the thickness or the
uneven heights of the folds and failed to
step high enough to clear the top or had her
heel caught in a hole formed by the folds.
In passing over the canvas, Mrs. Baker
is charged with exercising that degree of
care uhich a prudent person would exercise
under those particular circumstances, and
as a general rule, the degree of care she
was required to exercise would be in
proportion to the danger suggested by the
presence of the articles on the floor.
Here, the danger or hazards were slight
and extraordinary vigilance was not required.
The situation was largely static, so no great
potentialities or harm were apparent, and
Mrs. Baker was not hurrying or rushing down
the hall. She was conscious of her duty
to use due care in passing over the carpet
covering. She was bound to exercise her
sense of sight, but the ordinary use of this
sense does not require that she exactly
calculate or determine every possible means
of escaping injury. There is a zone of
probable error permitted to her before she
can be charged as a matter of law with not
having used due care, and the determination
of this zone is a jury function. n
11
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The Baker case is exactly in point as to choice

of routes and as to negligence in falling while
going through the weeds or canvas.

It holds

those questions are for the jury.

Therefore,

the trial court erred in ruling summarily that
appellant was contributorily negligent and
assumed the risk as a matter of law.
Respectfully submitted,
SKEEN,

t~ORSLEY,

SNOt·1 &

CHRISTENSEN and

Joseph J. Palmer
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant
701 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

